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ownership. In this paper, I show that that income underreporting by entrepreneurs can explain the
lack of evidence for monetary premia. Using a large national dataset (PSID), I first document
evidence of underreporting, and then proceed to make alternative comparisons using measures of
consumption. I find that the self-employed enjoy large earnings premia that are reflected in their
consumption.
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1. Introduction
This paper examines the monetary returns to entrepreneurship. I compare rewards of selfemployment to those of wage employment. This is, of course, an exercise that has been carried
out many times before. However, previous studies have typically overlooked a potentially
important source of bias that arises from the propensity of entrepreneurs to underreport their
income. As a result, evidence that entrepreneurship is not a monetarily rewarding undertaking,
and that other nonmonetary rewards must be important (Hamilton 2000; Moskowitz and VissingJorgensen 2002), may be misleading. In this paper I produce indirect evidence of underreporting
of income in survey data, and I provide alternative measures of monetary rewards to
entrepreneurship based on consumption data. The paper also estimates the effects of previous
business ownership on current consumption. Contrary to some recent investigations, I find
entrepreneurship to be a financially rewarding activity.
Numerous obstacles present themselves when measuring the earnings of entrepreneurs. First, the
distribution of income appears to have fat tails, suggesting that OLS estimates are likely to be
unreliable.1 In this paper, I employ a quintile regression method, which is a better metric for
contrasting earnings distributions produced by two groups, such as wage workers and the selfemployed (Hamilton 2000). Second, because the returns to self-employment consist of salary and
accumulated business equity, the income of entrepreneurs is hard to define and track. Business
equity is hard to measure unless the researcher examines the entire lifespan of a given firm, and
even then, dissolution of a business only reveals its equity value at that particular point in time. In
other words, an entrepreneur could have received more (or less) funds if she was to sell the
business earlier. The issue is further complicated by entrepreneurs who stay in business for
periods beyond the boundaries of any data collection survey. However, by tracking consumption
instead of income, it may be possible to capture the wealth effect by observing increased
spending of the entrepreneur. Additionally, lifestyle comparisons obtained from consumption
measures are likely to be more reliable because they do not rely on income, which, even if not
hidden, is computed differently from wage income due to different legal metrics and reporting
methods by entrepreneurs.
At the same, time some benefits of self-employment are very hard to measure, regardless of the
metric at hand. Much more serious complications arise if a researcher attempts to measure less
obvious business benefits, some of which include use of business assets for personal use, or
claiming personal expenditures as business expenses. Nonmonetary benefits of wage
employment, such as fringe benefits, are much easier to measure because they appear as business
costs on their employers' books. This drawback associated with difficulty of measuring
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The heavy right tail of this income distribution produces support for the superstar theory (Rosen 1981)
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nonmonetary benefits of self-employment is also better addressed through consumption
comparisons: the researcher can detect differences in particular consumption categories in which
there is no overlap with business expenditures – housing expenditures, vacations, money spent on
clothing, etc.
The consumption comparison approach carries significant benefits in assessing and addressing
both expense overstatements and income underreporting. By examining expenditures in a number
of discrete categories and subcategories, I can allocate particular expenditures into business,
individual consumption, or both categories, thus facilitating better estimates of earnings spent on
personal consumption. Overstatements of business expenditures, together with hiding of income
by the self-employed, comprise the underreporting gap. The underreporting gap is quite
significant given that U.S. General Office of Accounting states that entrepreneurs are responsible
for 68% of the $48 billion underreported gap in 1987 (USGAO 1990). It is a striking number
considering that the self-employment rate remained below 10% throughout the 1980s (Hipple
2004).
In this paper, I show that consumption among entrepreneurs is strictly greater than consumption
of wage earners, even after controlling for race, education, experience, family size, and wealth.
This is in striking contrast to recent investigations, claiming that entrepreneurship does not pay
(Hamilton 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002). These investigations have relied on
income data in order to reach their conclusions without any adjustments for income
underreporting, which is best detected by examining consumption data. To detect income
underreporting, one has to either assume (or calculate) saving rates for each of the groups (selfemployed and wage earners), or assume that an individual’s propensity to save is constant over
time. I rely heavily on previous estimates of saving rates in assessing income underreporting.
Noting that entrepreneurs save more than their wage counterparts (Caner 2003; Dynan, Skinner et
al. 2004; Siman 2008) by creating an interaction term of income and self-employment, I am able
to detect underreporting of earnings. Higher saving rates by the entrepreneurs should then lead to
a negative sign of the interaction term when regressing expenditure of the self-employed on
income, demographics, and the interaction term. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), I show repeatedly a positive, highly significant sign on the interaction term, suggesting
extensive underreporting of income. I also detect underreporting using a second assumption
(constant individual marginal propensities to save) by observing changes in sign of an interaction
term (income and self-employment status) with change of employment status.
I then proceed to compare wage rewards to entrepreneurial rewards without using income by
switching to consumption metrics. Not surprisingly, consumption comparisons shows greater
benefits for the entrepreneurs than do income comparisons. These results might of course be
contaminated by sample selection problems. Sample selection bias could arise because a sample
2

of current entrepreneurs consists of those who either just started or those who chose to remain
self-employed and are thus deemed to be successful entrepreneurs. However, to form an accurate
interpretation of entrepreneurial earnings, it is important to examine the earnings of all subjects,
not just the successful ones. I therefore also estimate effects of previous business ownership on
current consumption in order to ameliorate. I find evidence that those remaining in business enjoy
the largest consumption premium but even those who are no longer self-employed, on average,
get a small increase in their consumption. Additionally, making sure the sign of the interaction
term switches for individuals at the same time as changes in their individual self-employment
status (i.e., going back into wage sector, or becoming self-employed), ensures that underreporting
accounts for sign of the interaction term and not some fixed effect, which could be associated
with people who are more likely to undertake entrepreneurship.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature, Section 3 describes
the data, Section 4 constructs the analysis, and Section 5 concludes.

2. Literature Review
Measuring earnings is important because it could help researchers and policymakers understand
the entrepreneur. In the most simple scenario, policymakers want to be able to identify able
entrepreneurs ex ante in order to provide the future self-employed the necessary support. The
entrepreneur is the Supermen of economics, he is credited with fostering innovation, creating
jobs, keeping production efficient, and producing exactly what consumers desire.
As Adam Smith noted,
[w]hen an independent workman, such as a weaver or shoemaker, has got more stock
than what is sufficient to purchase the materials of his own work, and to maintain
himself till he can dispose of it, he naturally employs one or more journeymen with the
surplus, in order to make a profit by their work (Smith 1776).

If this career choice is motivated by profit, as in Smith's vision, then it is a very straight forward
case where uncertainty of business profits is rewarded by a larger than wage profit (profit for
Adam Smith is the combination of interest and risk rewards). Hence, the expectation is that
entrepreneurial earnings are higher than what the entrepreneur can get otherwise by earning a less
risky wage working for someone else. There could be other nonmonetary reasons as to why
people choose these careers. However, it seems that alternative explanations are proposed only
after self-employment is found not to be financially rewarding, because otherwise profit is the
most natural explanation for why people choose entrepreneurship.
The inquiry into earnings comparison originates in the desire to empirically verify several models
explaining why some people choose entrepreneurship. One of the first rigorous theoretical mods
3

to explain entrepreneurship was developed by Kihstrom and Laffont (1979) who stipulated that
risk tolerances were responsible for selection into an entrepreneurial. Essentially, a random
parameter in the production function imposes some uncertainty on the output, thus attracting
more risk tolerant agents to business ownership. Unfortunately, risk is hard to measure
empirically, although several attempts have been made (Hersch and Viscusi 2001; Cramer,
Hartog et al. 2002; Sanarelli and Vivarelli 2007; Krichevskiy 2009). Nonetheless, Kihlstrom and
Laffont opened up the floodgates of theoretical models and empirical investigations by formally
modeling what Adam Smith in 1770s and Frank Knight in the 1920s stipulated about the
entrepreneur (Smith 1776; Knight 1916-1921).
Three new classes of models have subsequently emerged: 1) investments and agency models
(Lazear and Moore 1984) claiming that earnings profiles differ from wage workers to selfemployed because entrepreneurs do not need to be provided incentivized to perform. 2)
Matching and learning models (Jovanovic 1982) where entering firms do not know what the true
costs are and thus have to rely on some prior beliefs to make an entry choice. Upon entry, costs
are revealed and firms update their beliefs about their costs (this could be viewed as firm quality)
and only the best survive, while those that made an erroneous entry choice exit. 3) Alternatively,
either the beliefs (Steen 2004) or the information used in updating (Krichevskiy 2008) could be
incorrect, or the utility is not fully measured because there could also be nonpecuniary benefits to
business ownership. If an entrepreneur is neither overoptimistic nor misled about the profit
potential upon entry, but earns less profit compared to wage work, it is reasonable to assume that
she derives her utility elsewhere (e.g. the benefit of being in control). However, these conclusions
are usually drawn only after the realization that entrepreneurship is not as monetarily rewarding
as wage work. In all three models, mentioned above, rewards matter and the next step is to
empirically measure those rewards. Nonpecuniary benefits aside, which group has higher
earnings?
There are papers claiming that entrepreneurship does not pay (Hamilton 2000; Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jorgensen 2002), as well as other works claiming that entrepreneurs are better off (Rees
and Shah 1986; Borjas and Bronars 1989; Brock and Evans 1989; Evans and Leighton 1989;
Quadrini 1999). The varied conclusions are caused by numerous complications associated with
defining an average entrepreneur, choice of household vs. individual comparison, measuring
entrepreneur’s profits (business equity in particular), choice of hourly wage vs. annual income
comparisons, and by a choice of control variables. For example, Quadrini (1999) reports higher
household annual incomes for families whose head of the household is self-employed and those
who have any family member as the self-employed. He main goal of Quadrini’s paper is to
measure wealth accumulation by the entrepreneurs; he uses both Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) and Consumer Survey of Finance (CSF) data. However, Quadrini does not
control for either education or hours worked; he also does not measure business equity. In
4

contrast, Hamilton (2000), finds that entrepreneurs get both lower initial earnings and lower
earnings growth. Hamilton uses the Survey of Program and Income Participation (SIPP) and
estimates hourly earnings while also controlling for education and tracking changes in business
equity.
This paper uses annual income and annual consumption measures. I do not think hourly earnings
are the best metric for measuring monetary rewards to employment, because the nature of work is
different for the self-employed. First, the self-employed base their work hours on the demands of
the business and are oftentimes not able to replace their expertise with that of employees. There is
also no supervisor to make sure they only take, say, thirty minutes for lunch, meaning reported
work hours are not necessary actual work hours (since business owners come and go as they
please). Because of the absence of oversight, entrepreneurs may feel that they spend an entire
workday at their business while in-between they might have managed to pick up their kids from
schools or accomplish other personal tasks. Most wage jobs in the private and public sectors do
not allow such flexibility.
Second, most wage workers (especially in the lower half of the income distribution) would be
happy to work overtime, thus accumulating more annual hours, but the choice is not theirs to
make (business owners who have to pay higher wage rates for hours exceeding 40 hour per week
are often discouraged from providing additional work hours to their workers). I draw a distinction
between controls such as education, experience, race, and family size versus hours worked, with
the former being a universal measure across population and the latter being a very different
metric depending on the group in question. Unlike Hamilton, I therefore choose annual earnings
measures instead of hourly earnings.
Hamilton also addresses distributional differences by running quintile regressions, since the
distribution of earnings for the self-employed is noted to have fat tails, this idea first emerged as a
superstar theory put forward by Rosen (1981). Noting these distributional differences I also
employ quintile regressions in my comparisons. Unfortunately, neither Quadrini nor Hamilton
addresses the income underreporting issue, which is likely to change both of their estimates.
Some researchers maintain that income underreporting is partially circumvented because most
research is based on many surveys that ask income questions directly and that do not rely on
income tax data (Hamilton 2000). The idea is that net profits are not reported correctly but so
long as econometricians have reported salary draw, overstatements of expenses do not appear in
the data. This may not be true if the salary draw is also not reported honestly. My dataset contains
both income reported to the IRS and income reported to the surveyors. The two income measures
are very similar and produce virtually identical regression estimates; thus, income reported to the
IRS is not different from that which is reported to researchers. Hence, if a person has reasons to
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misrepresent her income for the IRS, she is just as likely to do the same when it comes to
interviews with government-funded surveys.
The finding that self-employed underreport their income is not new. It has long been suspected
that self-employment provides an opportunity for the tax evasion and underreporting. This
problem is not as rampant among wage earners whose income is reported by their employers.
Thus, wage earners are not necessarily made of higher moral fiber; they are simply deprived of
the tax evasion opportunity. To address the widespread underreporting by the self-employed
several measures have been proposed (Klepper and Nagin 1989; Feinstein 1991; Adreoni, Erard
et al. 1998; Schuetze 2000). One way to overcome the problem and estimate someone’s income is
to use consumption (expenditure) estimates (Pissarides and Weber 1989) via parametric (Baker
1993) and nonparametric (Tedds 2005) measures. These expenditure estimates give a researcher
an idea as to how much a person should be earning (on average) given her level of consumption. I
explore this avenue by examining consumption differences between entrepreneurs and wage
earners. I measure distributional differences when comparing several measures of consumption
for wage earners and the self-employed. I also find evidence of underreporting by entrepreneurs.
Income underreporting places a big question mark on the traditional income comparisons among
wage earners and the self-employed. I suggest building consumption measures instead of outright
income comparisons. To detect underreporting by the self-employed, I have to rely on the wellsupported assumption that entrepreneurs save more (Quadrini 1999; Caner 2003; Dynan, Skinner
et al. 2004; Siman 2008).
In fact, wealthy individuals save more regardless of occupation (Reiter 2004). Wealth itself is
correlated with entrepreneurship, or with so-called entrepreneurial ability (Hurst and Lusardi
2004); entrepreneurs obtain higher wealth precisely because they save more. Entrepreneurs invest
heavily in their own business (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002), which is oftentimes
driven by either the information asymmetry or the expense and unavailability of external
financing. Continued re-investment into an entrepreneur’s own business could also hide some
earnings from the observer.
It appears that while, earning a lot less than their wage counterparts, entrepreneurs save a lot
more. While it has been found that entrepreneurs accumulate more wealth (Quadrini 1999), most
of the studies of saving patterns used income as a variable (Caner 2003; Siman 2008), which may
be problematic if income information is biased due to commonly overstated business expenses
and understatement of income. But in a recent careful examination Dynan et al., (2004) found
that saving rates are almost identical for samples which included and excluded entrepreneurs.
While zeroing in on the saving rates of the self-employed was not their explicit goal, by
examining several large datasets (Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Survey of Consumer
Finances, and Consumer Expenditure Survey) and looking at the long term (10 years) income
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averages they were able to side-step the issue of underreporting by entrepreneurs in establishing
saving rates (over the periods of time extending beyond business tenure), even while using
income. Thus, it is fair to assume when doing consumption comparisons that entrepreneurs do not
save less than their wage counterparts.
Armed with the fact that entrepreneurs save more, it is worth re-examining the income-wealth
relationship. Two components of the income-wealth relationship and findings about savings still
pose some problems: (1) it appears that entrepreneurs need to save a lot of their income to make
up in wealth. This is paradoxical since it is hard to imagine people with a smaller income saving
more (in absolute terms) than those whose incomes are significantly larger and (2) much more
troubling, income estimates for entrepreneurs are not reliable if there is any underreporting on the
part of the self-employed. Mindful of these underreporting issues, I re-examine the income of the
self-employed and compare it to the income of wage-workers. To circumvent the issue of income
underreporting, I design consumption measures to better estimate levels of disposable income. I
find that controlling for demographic variables and assets that self-employed consume more,
regardless of whether total expenditure, housing values and expenditures, car values, or utilities
expenditures are used as a measure. As a result, this paper contributes to the existing selfemployed vs. wage-worker income comparison debate as it points to significant monetary
rewards associated with self-employment that are not captured by traditional income measures.
There is also a bigger issue for economists to tackle, related to the core question of who reaps
more benefits from their respective jobs, the self-employed or the wage worker? To understand
who benefits more, income has been used as a means of obtaining desired goods and services.
However, this may not be fully appropriate when comparing self-employed individuals with wage
workers, even if neither group attempts to hide its incomes from the IRS (or surveys). Because
business owners have the power to decide how business assets are used, and can potentially use
these assets for personal benefits (e.g. transportation using the company car), it might be
worthwhile to include these benefits into calculations of received earnings. Granted, sometimes
similar benefits are available to the wage workers, for example a cab driver who does not own a
vehicle may still go and do his grocery shopping using the cab car. However, these benefits are at
the discretion of the business owner, and in many cases must be reported as income. In other
words, if a business has a nice car, beach condo etc., business owners receive the same utility
from using these resources as private owners do, and thus they ultimately choose to use their cars,
properties and other assets as they see fit. Unlike the intangible and unquantifiable psychological
rewards of business ownership, resource use is tangible and should be measured. I argue that in
light of the scope for underreporting, which is further complicated by definitional difficulties (in
terms of what is a legitimate business expense and what is not) of income itself, consumption
instead of income can be used to contrast monetary benefits of employment.
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Although consumption seems like a natural proxy for earnings, several challenges remain. First
issue is the inability of researcher to separate true business expenditures from personal use
consumption. For example, a self-employed person may purchase an expensive car to later write
it off as a business expense. While this car could be helpful in signaling quality of the selfemployed to potential clients, making it a very useful business tool, the owner also enjoys this
high quality product. For example, when hiring a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) a customer
may perceive an expensive car driven by the CPA as a signal of experience, quality, or sign of
fewer instances of IRS audit, all of which are measures of success. In this example the expensive
car aids the entrepreneur (CPA) in attracting business clientele making it a useful business asset.
However, at the end of the day, when she goes to the stores, malls, and restaurants, she enjoys the
quality of the car in the pure consumption sense.
Another issue arises with self-selection of people into self-employment. It may be necessary to
have collateral in order to secure the funding crucial for establishment of a business. Hence, by
observing that more of the self-employed own their own housing we cannot conclude that these
differences are due to larger incomes as the wage workers with large incomes may be kept out of
the self-employment due to lack of collateral. Accumulation of collateral can either come from
bequest or from saving over time. So are the entrepreneurs (or prospective entrepreneurs)
different when it comes to lifelong saving behavior?
To ensure that these entrepreneurial individuals do not have some fixed effect associated with
their saving behavior and thus causing the income-entrepreneurship interaction term to serve as a
proxy for this fixed effect: I look at the long-term history of business ownership. I create a
number of terms interacting indicators for prior business ownership with current consumption.
Observing the sign of the interaction terms, contingent on current business ownership only
(essentially observing change in sign with the change of self-employment status),I find additional
re-assurance that it is underreporting and not some fixed effect that is responsible for significant
sign of the interaction term. This method has not been previously used in the underreporting
literature which has previously assumed the same marginal propensity to consume for everyone
(Pissarides and Weber 1989). The only assumptions that I make are that 1) consumption is
reported truthfully for everyone, 2) marginal propensities to consume remain constant for all
agents for the duration of the study, and 3) self-employed individuals have higher saving rates, as
has been repeatedly demonstrated (Quadrini 1999; Caner 2003; Dynan, Skinner et al. 2004;
Siman 2008).

3. Data
I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) as it offers a number of asset variables, income
variables and most recently (starting with 2005 data) a number of detailed consumption variables.
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The PSID is designed to track individuals, but it also collects income and expenditure information
on their spouses and, to a lesser degree, on other family members living with them. While my
dataset does not contain a long history of consumption, it does have business ownership history,
which I use to estimate the long-term effects of business ownership. By examining how current
consumption levels differ among wage earners some of whom were previously self-employed but
no longer are, I can see how long these differences persist after a person returns to wage
employment.
My dataset consists of detailed observations for 2005, with demographic and income variables
going as far back as the 1995 wave. I examine consumption to produce results compatible to
income estimates of Hamilton (2000), I restrict my sample to males. Following convention, I
exclude farmers and anyone outside the 18-65 age range. I also exclude people earning practice
income, since they are often re-classified into self-employment as they become partners in their
firms, but they are not self-employed in the conventional sense. The resulting sample consists of
4,797 people. Of these, 708 are what I will call self-employed (14.77%). This number is
unusually high. Participants of the PSID survey are asked if they are working, and if ”yes”, then
the following options are given: (i) for someone else, (ii) themselves or (iii) both? Only seven
percent of those surveyed work for themselves. However, since I am examining consumption and
household consumption records are not disaggregated, it is possible to determine whose income
went towards what (in terms of purchasing goods and services by members of the household), I
use another variable in PSID in deciding whether the person is a part of the self-employed group.
If any person answers positively to the question of whether they, or anyone else in their
household, are self-employed, I place them in the self-employed group. I create similar variables
for other years of the survey going back to 1995.
The PSID underwent major revisions in 1997, starting bi-annual interviews instead of previously
conducted annual interviews. Hence, my dataset includes 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003,
and 2005 interview variables. Demographic variables are carried through unless there is a change.
I use demographic variables for the current year (2005) as the controls in the analyses. I also
construct variables capturing whether a business owner is present in the household since the
previous survey. In other words if there was a self-employed person in 1995-97 but since then he
or she either went back to the wage sector or left the household, I create a variable capturing this
change in order to trace the effects of previous business tenure on current consumption.
It is not immediately obvious which consumption measure should be employed. I create several
consumption measures with total annual consumption being the broadest – it includes total annual
expenditure on housing, transportation (car leases, gasoline, parking, insurance, and public
transportation), utilities (net of subsidies), food, clothing, child-care, adult-care, schooling, home
repair, vacations, entertainment, and total donations. In the case of transportation, cars are often
9

claimed as business expenses, but they are consumption goods as well. I keep expenditure on cars
as consumption in my sample and exclude utility vehicles, which are used more for business than
as consumption goods. I replicated my analysis excluding pickup trucks as well. This exclusion
did not alter the results to any significant degree, so I re-introduced the pickup truck category into
the data set, while excluding utility vehicles. In other measures of consumption, I used using
housing or utilities as the dependent variables only – these are much narrower definitions that
oftentimes do not detect significant differences between the two groups.
Income in my analysis includes wages, interest, royalties, rent, dividends and both public and
private transfers. This variable encompasses head of the household income and spouse’s income
as well. Additional income brought in by other family members both present at the household and
transferring money from elsewhere is also accounted. I also repeated the entire analysis using
taxable income, which is asked separately in the survey. The results were practically identical and
are not reported here.

4. Group Differences, Underreporting and the Long Term Effects of SelfEmployment
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Group Differences
I first set out to explore population differences between the self-employed and wage workers. I
then examine their respective consumption profiles controlling for these differences. The two
populations differ along every measured dimension. First, the average self-employed person is
older, more likely to be married, with more work experience and education; he has greater selfreported income and he also consumes more. I conduct non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests (Conover 1999) on expenditure, income, education, and experience distributions. In each
case, the distribution of the self-employed dominates those of wage workers, with p-values near
zero. In my sample 86 percent of business owners are married compared to the 78 percent of
married wage workers. The self-employed also differ from wage earners along racial,
educational, and experience lines as well (Table 1). As for distribution differences the findings
are well in-line with the expectations given that self-employed are more experienced, and older.
Another dimension along which the self-employed differ markedly from wage workers is in the
amount of household assets and debt. The self-employed own more of all types of assets,
including housing assets, stocks, and certificates of deposit. At the same time, the self-employed
carry more debt (Table 2). Assets are necessary to obtain business financing, which is reflected in
the greater housing equity held by the self-employed. Additionally, both assets and business loans
generate debt since all of these are likely to be financed.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Variables
Self-Employed

Wage Workers

Mean age

46.46

40.65

No children

54.06

51.19

2 or more kids

9.37

11.81

High school diploma only

26.85

34.59

2 year college

17.65

19.82

4 years +

15.54

7.49

Race white

64.57

82.13

10 yrs or less experience

40.91

53.11

20 yrs or more experience

21.52

16.5

Values are percentage of total population

Table 2
Assets and Debt Comparison
Self-Employed

Wage Workers

Mean CD Savings

$31,154

$8,710

Median CD Savings

$5,000

$1,000

Percent of Population with CD ≥ 25,000

24.19

9.04

Mean Housing Equity

$142,575

$94,768

Median Housing Equity

$74,500

$53,000

Percent of Population with Housing equity>500,000

8.2

2.09

Mean Family Debt

$16,844

$7,709

Median Family Debt ≥ 10,000

$2,000

$500

Percent of Population with Family Debt ≥ 25,000

13.12

8.39

Significant demographic group differences create two very different income and consumption
profiles. At the same time, even the raw plots of the distributions suggest some disparity in the
reliability of income reporting. Figure 1 depicts estimated consumption and income distributions
for the two groups. It demonstrates a within group income-consumption contrast revealing
interesting patterns. In the case of the self-employed, it seems that consumption outpaces income,
suggesting some underreporting of income taking place. There is no reason for which an entire
group of people would be consuming beyond their current income – unless the group in question
11
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is the unemployed. Yet it seems that self-employed households enjoy consumption well beyond
the levels allowed by the earnings they receive. At the same time, merely observing these
differences of distributions is not sufficient to deduce that there is any underreporting of income.
4.2 Personal Income and Expenditure Comparisons
Unconditional distributions provide only a limited insight and are not entirely suitable for the
comparison of rewards to employment – especially given what we know about differences in
education, experience, and financial wellbeing among the two populations. Thus, I produce
conditional estimates of both incomes and expenditures controlling for education, experience, and
family size. I regress demographic variables and the self-employed dummy on both expenditure
and the total consumption as in (1) and (2)
ܧ = ߚ + ᇱ ߚ + ܼ + ߳

(1)

ܫ = ߚ + ᇱ ߚ + ܼ + ߦ

(2)
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where ܧ is expenditure, ܫ is income,  ܆ is a vector of demographic variables and ܼ is a selfemployment dummy. I produce both OLS estimates and quantile regression estimates at the 25th,
50th, and 75th percentiles, mindful of the fat tail distributions documented by Hamilton (2000).
Tables 3 and 4 provide the results.
Table 3
Expenditure and Self-Employment
Variable
Education

Race White

Experience

Family size

Self-Employed

Constant

R-squared

OLS

Quantile Regression
.25

.50

.75

8.77***

3.32***

5.52***

9.54***

(2.55)

(.20)

(.30)

(.93)

-18.17

6.51***

7.76***

10.28**

(14.52)

(1.28)

(1.72)

(4.39)

-0.84

.095

.50***

1.20***

(.74)

(0.067)

(.09)

(.21)

55.24***

-7.50***

-6.86***

-10.64**

(11.69)

(.88)

(1.37)

(4.17)

35.51*

11.74***

19.74***

39.99***

(18.34)

(1.61)

(2.17)

(5.54)

2.48

-19.55**

-36.38***

-61.70***

(35.65

(2.90)

(4.23)

(12.71)

0.013

0.04

0.048

0.05

Dep. Var: Total Expenditure in thousands. N=3082
***α=0.01. **α=0.05. *α=0.1

It is immediately clear that the choice between mean or median comparisons, as well as the
choice of consumption versus income, yields very different results. Quantile regressions produce
a slightly better fit when comparing the R-squared of the OLS to the pseudo R-squared of any of
the quantile regressions; Figure 1 also shows severe skewness and non-normality, which also
suggests quantile regressions are more appropriate. Consequently, I shall pay more attention to
them than to the results obtained via OLS. However, using either specification, it is clear that
self-employed earn more. Moreover, regardless of the methodology, expenditure premiums of
self-employment are larger than income premiums. This suggests underreporting on part of the
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self-employed, especially since we would expect the opposite results given higher saving rates of
the self–employed.
Table 4
Income and Self-Employment
Variable
Education

Race White

Experience

Family size

Self-Employed

Constant

R-squared

OLS

Quantile Regression
.25

.50

.75

10.25***

4.61***

6.80***

8.54***

(1.17)

(.24)

(.32)

(.53)

24.75***

13.05***

16.11***

17.45***

(6.81)

(1.60)

(1.90)

(2.62)

.79**

.26***

.46***

1.06***

(.33)

(.088)

(.09)

(0.12)

-9.18**

-5.90***

-7.72***

-9.52***

(5.93)

(1.20)

(1.66)

(2.53)

30.79***

-.57

5.32**

16.47***

(8.77)

(2.04)

(2.45)

(3.40)

-83.59***

-35.96***

-45.62***

-46.29***

(16.39)

(3.52)

(4.59)

(7.33)

0.038

0.065

0.084

0.095

Dep. Var: total income in thousands. N=3601.
***α=0.01. **α=0.05. *α=0.1

4.3 Underreporting
A closer examination of the data suggests that some income claims made by the surveyed selfemployed individuals are not likely to hold up to scrutiny. For example, 51.8 percent of males
and their spouses who claim to be self-employed only (these are the households where everyone
is self-employed) claim to have received exactly zero income from their self-employment in
2005. This clearly is not likely. Additionally, it would mean severe dissavings on the part of these
households. To confirm my suspicion of underreporting I regress demographic variables such as
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race, individual’s education, experience, family size, total income and the interaction term
between income and business ownership on the total expenditure. My model specification is
ܧ = ߚ + ᇱ ߚ + ܫ + ܦ + ߝ

(3)

where ܧ is expenditure,  is the vector of demographic variables, ܫ is individual’s income, and
ܦ is the interaction term. I find strongly significant positive coefficients on the income x
business ownership interaction term (see Table 5). This suggests that the self-employed are
underreporting their income since their higher saving rates should lead to a negative coefficient if
they were to report their income honestly.
Table 5
Evidence of Income underreporting.
Variable

OLS

Quintile Regression
.25

.50

.75

Income

.000065445

.0001690939***

.0003322333***

.0005700435***

(.0000458526)

(.0000458526)

(.0000042246)

(.0000052913)

7.596428***

2.178698***

2.922443***

4.339161***

(2.801553)

(.1462655)

(.2578926)

(.5867257)

-18.17901

3.811877***

3.198972**

5.118825*

(16.32578)

(.9476383)

(1.50196)

(2.890641)

-.986501

0.03359129

.2768124***

.6390559***

(.8130209)

(.04890513)

(.07486109)

(.1382626)

72.16536***

-5.674421***

-5.218422***

-6.752845*

(13.83903)

(.7051715)

(1.267869)

(2.818167)

Interaction

.0002034619***

.0000526269***

.0000328126***

.0002601576***

Term

(.0000692232)

(.0000045018)

(.0000063774)

(.0000083956)

Constant

15.85689

-10.37368***

-16.34522***

-25.89748***

(39.23889)

(2.093101)

(3.610893)

(8.075975)

Education

Race
Experience

Family size

Dep. variable expenditure in thousands

(N=2705;=0.023; =0.084; =0.099;=0.11)

***α=0.01. **α=0.05. *α=0.1
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In Table 6, I demonstrate repeatedly (using specification (3) with variables representing current
income interacted with indicators for self-employment status in previous years) a positive sign on
the interaction term for current business owners and mixed signs for people who are no longer
self-employed (see Appendix for complete regression results). Finding mixed sign for the wage
workers' interaction terms is not surprising since I do not have any particular expectation about
the saving rates for the wage workers. In fact, the coefficient turns out to be negative for most
years, whereas for current business owners the positive sign suggests continued income
underreporting.
Table 6
Additional evidence of Income underreporting. (10th percentile)
Number of Cases Self
Self-Employed
Wage Worker
Employed (SE) and
2005
2005
Wage Workers (WW)

Interaction Term

1995xCurrent Income
1996xCurrent Income
1997xCurrent Income
1999xCurrent Income
2001xCurrent Income
2003xCurrent Income

.0000807***

.000177***

SE 158

(.0000277)

(.0000139)

WW 817

.0000980***

-.000169***

SE 164

(.0000276)

(.0000125)

WW 839

.0000708**

-.000171***

SE 171

(.0000325)

(.0000096)

WW 957

.0000381

-.000197***

SE 182

(.0000280)

(.0000112)

WW 1067

.0000697**

-.000197***

SE 192

(.0000318)

(.0000112)

WW 1185

.0000113***

-.000313**

SE 212

(.0000284)

(.0000142)

WW 1351

Dep. variable expenditure in thousands, ***α=0.01. **α=0.05. *α=0.1
Other regressors: Total Income, Education, Experience, Family Size, Race

The regressions in Table 6 show the sign of the interaction term to be contingent on business
ownership. In my regressions the interaction term for the self-employed always has both positive
sign. Table 6 presents results for the 10th quintile of the expenditure distribution using quantile
regression. These results are robust to changes in specification with similar signs on the
interaction coefficient for other quintiles. The regression signs for the lower 10th quintile are the
same as those from 25th, 75th, 90th, or 95th quintiles (not reported here). But for the 10th percentile
I find statistical significance for interaction term much more often (compared to 25th, 50th, or 75th
quintile). My suspicion is that 10th percentile shows a significant sign more often because of
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lower variances in the left tail of income distributions for both groups. The results in Table 6 lead
to the conclusion that the self–employed do not have any particular tendencies associated with
income underreporting as a fixed individual trait. To the contrary, they only underreport their
income while they are in still in business.
4.4 Long Run Effects
I now examine how previous business tenure effects current consumption. I regress the same
demographic variables (excluding income) on current consumption, adding previous business
ownership dummies. These dummies record previous years’ business ownership while all other
variables continue to report current consumption and current demographics. My model
specification is
ܧ = ߚ + ᇱ ߚ + ܼ + ߳

(4)

where Zi is a specific year of business ownership.
I run this specification for both types of individuals: those currently in the wage sector and those
currently self-employed. I produce estimates for both mean (via OLS regression) and median
(via quantile regressions). The results are very similar in nature with those agents who are still
self-employed enjoying the largest consumption premiums. For both median and mean estimates
the same cannot be concluded about the people who went back into the wage sector, as we cannot
observe the reason for this change of status. Returning to the wage sector could be due to failure
of business venture (bankruptcy for example) or it could be a successful sale of a business. There
is a large body of literature addressing firms' exit and how it is related to success and failure
(Headd 2003). The benefits of previous business ownership are highly correlated with current
consumption (survival and success go hand in hand). At the same time, the only conclusive
results for current wage workers who were previously self-employed is that, on average (in both
median and mean regressions), there is a positive shock to current consumption due to previous
business ownership. Median estimation results are summarized in Table 7, whereas mean
estimates (with the 95 percent confidence intervals) are shown in Figure 2.
Table 7 reveals that even after controlling for demographic differences long term average effects
are positive. On average, even after business tenure has completed, there are positive effects on
consumption that extend for up to four years after the termination of a business. Even combined
with the fact that for those that stayed in business effects are mostly larger, the finding of a
lingering positive effect suggests that undertaking self-employment has rewards even if one was
to go back into the wage sector. This suggests that on average, business termination is not failure
when compared to wage work. This, "on average" statement needs to be taken at face value while on average the effect is non-negative for many agents the change is negative nonetheless,
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because this average is not statistically significant and a large portion of the confidence interval is
in the negative territory . Recent investigation of long term effects using income finds that an
individual significant penalty (via income reduction) is paid by entrepreneurs returning to the
wage sector (Krichevskiy 2009), yet in the long run it pays off to attempt business ownership regardless of the success of the business venture. Using SIPP Krichevskiy (2009) finds that
people attempting business ownership have bigger chance of ending up in higher income classes.
These effects are likely to be even more pronounced given income underreporting of the selfemployed.

Table 7
Long Run Effects of Self-Employment (Median Regression)
Business
Ownership Year

Self-Employed

Wage Worker

2005

2005

Number of Cases Self
Employed

(SE)

and

Wage Workers (WW)
1995 Business
1996 Business
1997 Business
1999 Business
2001 Business
2003 Business

28.57**

18.18***

(12.81)

(5.65)

11.25**

11.25**

(4.89)

(4.89)

SE 185
WW 915
SE 192
WW 942

2.08

4.53

(9.89)

(4.77)

SE 202

1.96

1.22

(7.04)

(4.91)

3.71

3.71

(3.83)

(3.83)

.000011***

-.00031**

SE 248

(.000028)

(.000014)

WW 1517

WW 1073
SE 214
WW 1198
SE 226
WW 1330

Dep. variable expenditure in thousands, ***α=0.01. **α=0.05. *α=0.1
2

Other regressors : Total Income, Education, Experience, Family Size, Race

2

Full regression results are reported in the Appendix
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Figure 2. Long-Run Mean Effects with 95% Confidence Intervals
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Excluding income from the regressions completely is likely to create an omitted variable bias,
since income matters in the determination of an individual’s consumption levels. But as it is
underreported by the self-employed, including income will offset the findings associated with the
self-employed and the regression dummy coefficient. Hence, removal of income and using a
consumption comparison alone is more informative. I look at the coefficients of correlation for
the relevant variables and try to determine the magnitude of the bias created by the omission. It
could be assumed that the correlation coefficient for the wage workers is the unbiased estimate,
which could be used to adjust the incomes of the self-employed. However, economists are not yet
set on the systematic differences between the two groups and because of that we cannot assume
that the relationship of income to consumption is the same. This is partially because of different
spending patterns created by legitimate business expenses. Nonetheless, the coefficients of
correlation themselves provide some evidence of the disparities, but even very big systematic
differences among the two groups should not lead to the striking differences observed; I find a
coefficient of 0.48 for the self-employed and 0.04 for the wage workers. Needless to say that both
the difference over 10 times in magnitude and the 3% income consumption correlation for the
wage workers seem unrealistic. Clearly, better estimates are needed. An ideal way to address this
issue is via a long panel data examination with both income and consumption, which should
create better coefficients for people who have switched from self-employment into the wage
sector and back as their fixed effects could be controlled for. Nonetheless, this paper
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demonstrates the importance of underreporting issue, which needs to be carefully considered in
any earnings comparison.

5. Conclusions
The self-employed are financially better off compared to the wage workers even after controlling
for their respective demographics. This finding is in stark contrast to some of the recent literature
on income comparisons (e.g., Hamilton 2000). The main reasons for this disparity are that this
paper pays particular attention to the underreporting issue, largely ignored elsewhere, and the
choice of annual income versus hourly wage comparisons. None of the recent income
comparisons of self-employed and the wage worker controls for the income underreporting by the
self-employed. I find significant evidence of income underreporting by the self-employed which
casts doubts on conclusions stating that self-employment is not as financially rewarding as wage
work.
Comparisons undertaken in this paper find that the self-employed are better off in terms of both
income and consumption, even after controlling for education, experience, and demographic
variables. Perhaps the entire income definitions need to be re-written whenever evaluating selfemployment. Researchers need to be very careful in separating business expenses from those of
pure consumption. Having said that, there is often no clear line about the proportions of good’s
used for many mixed purpose expenses (cars are a good example of this). In this paper I address
the issue of mixed purpose expenses by reducing the vehicle category to exclude various types of
cars, some of which appear to carry much smaller consumption utility and much larger business
purpose. At the same time this paper does not address a full addition of the fringe benefits to the
rest of the consumption due to data availability. Therefore, even the consumption measures
created here are only limited representatives as both large categories, such as fringe benefits, as
well as small categories of incidental spending and numerous services categories are not
accounted for in the survey. There should be no situation in which self-employed people with
similar characteristics earn less; this is because they can simply close shop and move into wage
employment. The only scenario where the above situation can persist is when there are some
benefits not captured by income. I argue that consumption captures some of the benefits not
reflected by income (for example personal use of business assets). At the end of the day, the selfemployed consume more and are thus better off. These differences are both robust to changes in
definitions of consumption and persistent across the two distributions.
Annual earnings comparisons are a better metric because entrepreneurs can choose to work more
hours whenever business conditions allow whereas wage earners mostly depend on the
entrepreneurs (and managers) to make these choices for them. Due to current law structure
workers are usually more motivated to work overtime (since they get paid more than their regular
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fare); in most cases, they are not able to work the hours that they want. Earnings, in the end of the
day, are only the means necessary for the acquisition of goods and services. It is goods and
services (current or future) that people are really after. Hence, consumption comparison is a more
direct metric in comparison of benefits to employment across groups. For example, a much fuller
picture of how taxing unemployment is could be drawn by examining individual's consumption
before, during, and after the unemployment spell, as the actual hardships can be observed by
looking at substitutions in consumption.
The long term effects of business ownership, while non-negative on average, do not seem to
persist for people returning to the wage sector. This is because there could be various reasons
responsible for the end of business tenure. At one extreme, a business may end because it was a
complete failure, while at the other termination of a business could be due to a successful sale by
the entrepreneur.
Some limitations arise consumption comparisons are on the household level. The self-employed,
in this context, are households that have someone who is self-employed as a member. Any
changes in household makeup can move the household into either wage or self-employment
category, having nothing to do with either business origination or the termination of such venue.
For the self-employed still in business, previous business ownership is correlated with current
increase of consumption as one would expect. Unfortunately, since the PSID has only recently
started to track expenditure variables, our ability to measure long-run effects is very limited. This
is the limitation of cross-section analysis, which can only be corrected with evaluation of the
panel data.
Better income estimates need to be constructed in the future with income underreporting
corrections made for the self-employed. The obvious difficulty lies in estimating the magnitude of
underreporting. Perhaps a long panel data containing income, consumption, assets, and
employment data needs to be examined, as the cross-section analysis is able to detect the
underreporting issues but not correct for them.
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Appendix
Regressions for Table 6
Additional Evidence of Underreporting (Median Estimates)
Dependent variable expenditure in thousands, ***α=0.01. **α=0.05. *α=0.1
A1. Current propensities to save using 1995 employment status.
Current Wage Earners
Current Self-employed
Income

.000177722***
(.0000139353)

.0001760637***
(.0000280074)

Education

1.657036***
(.2229091)

.8809366
(.9877422)

Race White

1.955574*
(1.185384)

3.24959
(2.936027)

Experience

-.0536193
(.06186582)

.1522846
(.2037608)

Family size

-4.55209***
(.9903618)

-2.519669*
(1.390202)

(Self-Employed
1995)x(2005 Income)

.000177722***
(.0000139353)

.0000807228***
(.0000277231)

Constant

-12.2845***
(2.670906)

-6.404724
(15.07987)

N=817, R2=0.089

N=158, R2=0.16
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A2. Current propensities to save using 1996 employment status.
Current Wage Earners
Current Self-employed
Income

.0001881638***
(.00001257319)

.0001595584***
(.0000281575)

Education

1.854621***
(.2482233)

.8614481
(.9150135)

Race White

2.927793**
(1.410048)

2.456798
(2.872762)

Experience

.03436921
(.0685051)

.1516165
(.1855706)

Family size

-4.670029***
(.9261412)

-2.331599*
(1.347432)

(Self-Employed
1996)x(2005 Income)

-.0001698983***
(.0000125199)

.0000980634***
(.0000276934)

Constant

-15.9463***
(3.210247)

-6.16006
(13.28564)

N=839, R2=0.096

N=164, R2=0.16

A3. Current propensities to save using 1997 employment status.
Current Wage Earners
Current Self-employed
Income

.0001901903***
(.0000123907)

.0001842529***
(.0000328447)

Education

1.077878***
(.1617026)

1.181003
(.9881792)

Race White

2.61863**
(1.099963)

.9665809
(5.519584)

Experience

.07094096
(.05348281)

-.01802031
(.1775672)

Family size

-4.265715***
(.8894281)

-2.910628*
(1.527428)

(Self-Employed
1997)x(2005 Income)

-.0001711012***
(.0000096425)

.000070879**
(.0000325506)

Constant

-7.234556***
(2.093277)

-5.58392
(14.2219)

N=957, R2=0.089

N=171, R2=0.16
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A4. Current propensities to save using 1999 employment status.
Current Wage Earners
Current Self-employed
Income

.0002188864***
(.0000143044)

.000258373***
(.0000279386)

Education

.5615408***
(.1646435)

.6577603
(1.196253)

Race White

2.718512**
(1.099693)

-1.640338
(6.437674)

Experience

.02313125
(.05157134)

-.07083331
(.2362744)

Family size

-4.547023***
(.8895046)

-2.744733
(1.839639)

(Self-Employed
1999)x(2005 Income)

-.0001974567***
(.0000112482)

.0000381247
(.0000280574)

Constant

-.9092512
(2.119199)

1.817691
(16.97725)

N=1067, R2=0.096

N=182, R2=0.16

A5. Current propensities to save using 2001 employment status.
Current Wage Earners
Current Self-employed
Income

.0001911024***
(.0000164882)

.0002293289***
(.0000318041)

Education

.8929879***
(.1756677)

-.07335361
(1.176397)

Race White

2.397245**
(1.055269)

-2.522549
(6.93356)

Experience

.0386792
(.05366305)

-.05446202
(.2110872)

Family size

-4.377966***
(.7391648)

-2.775846
(1.959667)

(Self-Employed
2001)x(2005 Income)

-.000011739
(.0000180819)

.0000697666**
(.0000318041)

Constant

-4.705587**
(2.161508)

13.48344
(16.28237)

N=1185, R2=0.097

N=192, R2=0.16
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A6. Current propensities to save using 2003 employment status.
Current Wage Earners
Current Self-employed
Income

.0001943649***
(.0000142112)

.0001527923***
(.0000287006)

Education

.8216306***
(.1513525)

.7662472
(.9020232)

Race White

2.110387**
(.8718046)

1.331547
(5.466565)

Experience

.05597175
(.04399514)

-.06633353
(.1992514)

Family size

-4.574083***
(.6220216)

-3.100908**
(1.464956)

(Self-Employed
2003)x(2005 Income)

-.000313388**
(.0000142112)

.0000113688***
(.0000284406)

Constant

-3.494536*
(1.836009)

.6483869
(11.23985)

N=1351, R2=0.077

N=212, R2=0.16
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Long Run Effects (Median Estimates)
Dependent variable expenditure in thousands, ***α=0.01. **α=0.05. *α=0.1
A7. Effects of 1995 employment status on current expenditure.
Current Wage Earners
Current Self-employed
Education

7.076***
(.6638936)

10.75564***
(2.684138)

Race White

8.312667**
(3.350804)

5.244272
(20.56587)

Experience

.209333
(.1735715)

-.6293636
(.6929092)

Family size

-6.696444**
(2.801582)

-8.889273
(11.63469)

Self-Employed 1995

18.18467***
(5.656639)

28.57373**
(12.81543)

Constant

-54.56933***
(9.051145)

-84.50963
(42.65558)

N=915, R2=0.050

N=185, R2=0.061

A8. Effects of 1996 employment status on current expenditure.
Current Wage Earners
Current Self-employed
Education

7.508965***
(.6356214)

10.800***
(2.150845)

Race White

7.426621**
(3.236627)

-1.895273
(15.52712)

Experience

.2998621*
(.1652749)

-.1398182
(.5208083)

Family size

-7.151724**
(2.691952)

-21.42982*
(11.07528)

Self-Employed 1996

11.25234**
(4.895187)

28.06273***
(9.957066)

Constant

-60.25434***
(8.640316)

-82.30836
(33.05751)

N=942, R2=0.053

N=192, R2=0.063
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A9. Effects of 1997 employment status on current expenditure.
Current Wage Earners
Current Self-employed
Education

4.857238***
(.5156421)

9.74377***
(1.848756)

Race White

6.122857*
(3.132357)

6.303385
(12.97612)

Experience

.2480952
(.1569289)

.5830769
(.4479618)

Family size

-8.289571***
(2.783942)

-8.897693
(10.04055)

Self-Employed 1997

4.538
(4.771968)

2.083077
(9.8912681)

Constant

-24.17914***
(7.28194)

-78.05108
(27.67717)

N=1073, R2=0.040

N=202, R2=0.060

A10. Effects of 1999 employment status on current expenditure.
Current Wage Earners
Current Self-employed
Education

4.887877***
(.4741486)

7.911467***
(1.458155)

Race White

6.631234**
(2.822728)

11.67733
(10.34467)

Experience

.4017284***
(.1447127)

.3026667
(.3707955)

Family size

-9.086362***
(2.500521)

-14.45367**
(6.099329)

Self-Employed 1999

1.227868
(4.913084)

1.9696
(7.047)

Constant

-26.80052***
(6.677371)

-58.2656***
(22.05197)

N=1198, R2=0.040

N=214, R2=0.056

29

A11. Effects of 2001 employment status on current expenditure.
Current Wage Earners
Current Self-employed
Education

4.68387***
(.3860218)

8.039644***
(2.290889)

Race White

6.402304***
(2.227324)

1.044633
(16.38391)

Experience

.469087***
(.1145432)

.01542573
(.5648374)

Family size

-6.654967***
(1.688007)

-16.84731*
(10.10809)

Self-Employed 2001

3.715022
(3.836145)

14.87653
(11.09489)

Constant

-26.50613***
(5.33793)

-50.58998
(34.7174)

N=1330, R2=0.050

N=226, R2=0.057

A12. Effects of 2003 employment status on current expenditure.
Current Wage Earners
Current Self-employed
Education

4.426252***
(.3441727)

7.710286***
(1.309546)

Race White

7.48526***
(1.95912)

6.867858
(8.996112)

Experience

.4786866***
(.1008178)

.4078571
(.33343)

Family size

-6.519347***
(1.50875)

-7.574286
(7.192842)

Self-Employed 2003

.02457672
(3.837547)

7.814
(6.44438)

Constant

-25.2937***
(4.744954)

-58.376***
(19.3729)

N=1517, R2=0.037

N=248, R2=0.049
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